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COMMENT
SEXUAL EQUALITY: NOT FOR WOMEN ONLY
Until recent years, women were confined to the home and the family.
Paternalistic courts and legislatures perpetuated traditional sexual stereo-
types and thereby carefully circumscribed women's role in society.' Al-
though the state legislatures, in enacting these laws, may have intended to
protect women, such paternalistic legislation had the practical effect of pre-
cluding women from competing with men,2 particularly in the area of em-
ployment.
As women became more integrated into the labor market, however, they
began to challenge paternalistic statutes in order to receive equal treatment
with men.' Initially, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment' were the primary
vehicles used to attack discriminatory statutes. Success under these consti-
tutional provisions was slow as the Supreme Court struggled for a stan-
dard of analysis in sex discrimination cases.5 Later, with the enactment of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 women were able to contest
1. In the early 1900's, employers charged with violating protective state statutes regu-
lating the number of hours that women were permitted to work brought unsuccessful consti-
tutional challenges. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (women prohibited from
working in city restaurants between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.); Bosley v. McLaughlin,
236 U.S. 385 (1915) (maximum hour law for female hospital employees upheld); Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (women working in a hotel limited to an eight-hour day, 48
hour week); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (women factory workers cannot
work more than 56 hours per week); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (women prohib-
ited from working more than 10 hours a day in a laundry).
2. Courts have held that special recognition and favored treatment can constitutionally
be afforded women. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Gruenwald v. Gardner,
390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
3. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment.4
Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). See also Frug,
Securing Job Equalityfor Women." Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L.
REV. 55 (1979).
4. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV & V. Although the fifth amendment does not have an
equal protection clause as does the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment's due proc-
ess clause does prohibit the federal government from engaging in discrimination that is "so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
5. See generally Ginsburg, From No Rights, to Hal/ Rights, to Confusing Rights, 7
HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1978). See also note 154 and accompanying text infra.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Congress's objective in enacting Title VII was to
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discriminatory employment practices without resorting to the unpredict-
ability of the Court's equal protection analysis.7 Largely unrecognized in
the women's movement toward sexual equality, however, were the many
benefits men had derived from challenges to gender classification.
Indeed, the same sexual stereotypes that have deprived women of equal
rights in employment, education, social insurance, and fringe benefits have
denied men equal treatment, particularly in the areas of family law, social
security, and retirement benefits.8 This comment will analyze how consti-
tutional and statutory challenges to sex-based discrimination, specifically
in suits brought under the fourteenth amendment and Title VII, have
benefitted men and have helped redefine the role of men and women in
our society.9 Additionally, it will examine the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of an equal protection standard of analysis for sex discrimination
cases with the goal of discovering whether the Court's analysis has ade-
quately accommodated changing sex-role perceptions in America.
I. MEN, WOMEN, AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE - A
SUPREME COURT IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD OF ANALYSIS
Prior to 1971, it was well settled judicial policy to uphold gender-based
"achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of. . . employees over other employees." Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). See note 163 infra.
7. See note 154 and accompanying text infra.
8. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (social security benefit
formula providing more favorable benefit payments to retired women does not violate due
process clause of the fifth amendment where it directly addresses discrimination against wo-
men and tries to remedy it); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (provision of Social
Security Act providing survivors' benefits to widows but not to widowers unless widowers
received at least one-half of their support from their deceased wives, violated the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (different drinking
ages for men and women violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (statute precluding men from survivors' ben-
efits under Social Security Act but providing women with survivors' benefits violates the due
process clause of the fifth amendment); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property tax
exemption provided for widows, but not widowers, not violative of equal protection since
the exemption compensated women for past economic discrimination).
Of the seven sex discrimination cases considered by the Supreme Court between 1972 and
1975, all the challenges to practices discriminating against women were successful, see Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), while all the chal-
lenges to practices discriminating against men were unsuccessful. See Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). But see Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
9. Not all commentators agree that the alteration of traditional sex-role models is a
desirable social development. See, e.g., Ryman, .4 Commentary on Family Property Rights
and the Proposed 27th Amendment, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 505, 514 (1973).
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classifications under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'° Finding support for its position in traditional notions of the role
of men and women in society, the Supreme Court developed a "minimum
rationality" standard of analysis for sex discrimination cases brought
under the fourteenth amendment, giving great deference to the work of the
legislatures. Under this standard, only sex classifications resting on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective were
unconstitutional." Although the minimum rationality test produced con-
sistent results, it did so at great expense, for no gender classification failed
to survive constitutional attack; similarly situated people were treated dis-
similarly with the sanction of the judiciary.' 2
Myra Bradwell brought the first challenge to a gender classification in
Bradwell v. State,'3 alleging her right to practice law in the State of Illi-
nois. The Supreme Court determined that a state had the power to pre-
scribe qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts, and this
power was not affected by the fourteenth amendment.'" In his concurring
opinion, Justice Bradley stated that the Court's holding was supported by
the fact that both civil law and nature had always recognized a difference
in the respective sphere and destinies of men and women.' 5
10. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (Florida statute providing that no
woman shall be selected for jury service unless she volunteers not unconstitutional on its
face); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute forbidding any female to act
as a bartender unless she is the wife or daughter of the owner not violative of the fourteenth
amendment); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (state constitutional provi-
sion confining the right to vote to male citizens of the U.S. not violative of the Federal
Constitution). See also Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 13; Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Stan-
dardfor Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J. 163, 166.
11. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-26 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1060 (1978); Gunther, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
12. See notes 13-22 and accompanying text infra.
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
14. Bradwell was denied admission to the bar because: 1) she was married; 2) she was a
woman; and 3) clients would have difficulty enforcing their contracts with her. See Corker,
Bradwell v. State. Some Reflections Prompted by Myra Bradwells Hard Case that Made "'Bad
Law", 53 WASH. L. REV. 215 (1978).
15. This oft-quoted passage from Justice Bradley's concurrence exemplifies the concept
of "romantic paternalism":
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say the identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
19801
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Seventy-six years after the Bradwell decision in Goesaert v. Cleary,'6 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan statute' 7 requir-
ing all bartenders to be licensed, but prohibiting a woman from being li-
censed unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a
licensed liquor establishment. Since the state had a legitimate interest in
devising preventive measures for the moral and social problems that might
arise if women were bartenders,' 8 the Court deferred to the Michigan leg-
islature's reasonable belief that the "oversight assured through ownership
of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may
confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight."' 9
Again, in Hoyt v. Florida,2" the Court embarked upon a minimum ra-
tionality analysis. A woman convicted of second degree murder before an
all-male jury challenged a Florida statute providing that only women who
volunteered could be selected for jury service. 2' Despite the "enlightened
emancipation of women," the Court found that women were still regarded
as "the center of home and family life" and therefore the state's classifica-
tion was reasonable.
22
From the consistency with which the Court tolerated gender-based clas-
sifications, it was apparent that classifications based upon sex were not to
receive the strict scrutiny 23 accorded to laws discriminating on the basis of
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband ...
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the Law of the Creator.
83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
16. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
17. Law of April 30, 1945, Pub. Act No. 133, § 19a, 1945 Mich. Pub. Acts 146 (repealed
1955).
18. The Court relied on the proposition that the state could prohibit all women from
working as bartenders. 335 U.S. at 465.
19. Id at 466-67. The Court went on to say "that it could not cross examine either
actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives."
Id
20. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
21. FLA. STAT. § 40.01(1) (1959) (repealed 1967).
22. 368 U.S. at 61-62.
23. Courts apply the "strict scrutiny" test to statutory distinctions made on the basis of
immutable characteristics, such as race or national origin, which have the effect of invidi-
ously discriminating against a class of persons. Statutes embodying such distinctions may
only be sustained ifjustified by a "compelling state interest.' Fundamental interests such as




race,24 alienage,25 or national origin.26 In 1971, however, in Reed v.
Reed," the Supreme Court departed from its historical practice of uphold-
ing gender classifications by declaring governmentally imposed sex dis-
crimination unconstitutional for the first time, signalling a new era in
judicial scrutiny of sex-based discrimination.
A. From Reed to Stanton - A Quagmire of Judicial Decisions
The Supreme Court in Reed shifted from the traditional minimum ra-
tionality test that it had introduced in Bradwell toward a stronger standard
of analysis for sex classifications. In this case, both parents filed competing
petitions for the administration of their son's estate. When the father re-
ceived preference under the Idaho Code, the mother brought suit challeng-
ing the state's mandatory preference for males over females. The majority
instructed that sex-based classifications must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation. The Court reasoned that under this
approach persons similarly situated would be treated alike. 28 Applying
this standard to the case, the Court found that Idaho's mandatory prefer-
ence for males over females in the administration of intestate estates did
not bear a "rational relationship" to the state objective.29 The majority
rejected the argument that the male preference was a justifiable adminis-
24. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interra-
cial marriages violates equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (Florida criminal statute
prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from occupying the same room at night violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
25. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (state statutes restricting
welfare benefits on the basis of alienage found unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (dis-
criminatory application of city ordinance against Chinese aliens is violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
26. While legal restrictions placed upon a class of persons solely on the basis of their
national origin are immediately suspect, there are circumstances where "public necessity
may justify the existence of such restrictions." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (the exclusion of American citizens of Japanese descent from certain west coast
areas during WWII found to be a valid exercise of the war power); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (curfew imposed upon all persons of Japanese ancestry within
a designated military area found to be a valid exercise of the war power).
27. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). This was the first time the Supreme Court had responded af-
firmatively to a woman's complaint of unconstitutional sex discrimination.
28. Id. at 76.
29. The state objective was to reduce the workload of probate courts by eliminating one
class of contests. The Court found, however, that this objective was not advanced in a man-
ner consistent with the fourteenth amendment since the exclusion of the class of women,
rather than men, was nothing more than an arbitrary legislative choice. Id
1980]
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trative convenience and determined that such an arbitrary legislative
choice resulted in dissimilar treatment for men and women who were simi-
larly situated.3" Therefore, the unanimous Court3' held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. How-
ever, this new "rational relationship" test, a clear departure from the "min-
imum rationality" of the Bradwell line of cases, was not applied by the
Supreme Court in the next sex discrimination case it considered.
Instead, the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson32 evaluated the chal-
lenged statute under a "strict scrutiny" analysis.33 In the past, the strict
scrutiny analysis had been reserved for those cases where the challenged
classification was based upon an immutable characteristic such as race or
national origin. Unlike a classification subject to the rational basis test, a
classification can only withstand strict scrutiny when it is justified by a
compelling state interest. 34 In Frontiero, a woman challenged a federal
fringe benefit scheme35 providing that a serviceman could claim his wife as
a dependent, regardless of whether she was in fact dependent upon him for
any of her support. The statute prohibited a servicewoman, however, from
claiming her husband unless she demonstrated that he was in fact depen-
dent upon her for over one-half of his support. Despite the Government's
30. Id at 77.
31. The Supreme Court has rendered only one other unanimous sex discrimination de-
cision. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), discussed at notes 66-75 and
accompanying text infra.
32. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
33. One explanation offered for this departure is that Frontiero was essentially an equal
pay case. It was brought under the fifth amendment since Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
do not apply to the military. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 13. The Court's decision was
four to four and to date no fifth vote has been found to make sex a suspect classification. See
also note 23 and accompanying text supra.
Between Reed and Frontiero, the Court considered Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). There, the Court struck down a Louisiana workmen's compensa-
tion statutory scheme distinguishing between legitimate and dependent illegitimate children
with regard to compensation for the death of the natural father. Since legitimacy was re-
lated to status of birth, and therefore beyond the control of the infant, the Court examined
whether the statutory classification promoted a legitimate state interest. Finding that the
classification served no such interest, compelling or otherwise, the Court held that the denial
of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether
its strict scrutiny approach to discrimination against illegitimates rested upon fundamental
rights or the presence of a suspect class. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1057. One commentator
has criticized Justice Powell's majority opinion as an attempt "to blur the distinctions be-
tween strict and minimal scrutiny precedents by formulating an overarching inquiry appli-
cable to 'all' equal protection cases." Gunther, supra note 11, at 17.
34. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
35. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 10 U.S.C. § 1072 (2)(A) (1976).
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argument that the statutory purpose was administrative convenience,36 the
challenged statute could not withstand the Court's stricter scrutiny since its
ultimate effect was to relegate women to an inferior status by burdening
them with an additional economic disadvantage.37
Although the plurality in Frontiero examined the discriminatory effect
of the statute upon women, they did not address the statute's impact upon
men. The opinion can easily be read, however, as making either gender
per se or female gender alone a suspect classification. 38 Nevertheless, by
striking down the discriminatory statute, the Court repudiated the notion
of the independent male and dependent female and accorded men with
wives in the military the same benefits as women with husbands in the
military.39
The promise of a strict scrutiny approach in sex discrimination cases, as
articulated in Fronliero, was compromised in Kahn v. Shevin,4° the first
challenge to a gender classification brought by a male. Appellant Kahn, a
widower living in Florida, applied for the five-hundred-dollar property tax
exemption available to widows under a Florida statute.4 The state denied
his application because the statute did not provide an analogous benefit for
widowers. Applying Reed's rational relationship test, the Supreme Court
concluded that the challenged statute did not violate the fourteenth
amendment since there was a "fair and substantial" relationship42 between
Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers and the state policy
of diminishing the financial impact of spousal loss for the sex suffering the
36. 411 U.S. at 688-89. The Government conceded that the challenged statute served
no purpose other than that of mere "administrative convenience."
37. Id. at 689 n.22. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority's approach. He asserted
that the same conclusion could have been reached by following Reed's rational relationship
test. Furthermore, he criticized the Court for preempting the states' vote on the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA). Id at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). Ironically, the refusal of five
of the Justices to apply the strict scrutiny test in sex discrimination cases is a major reason
why the ERA is necessary. By refusing to find sex a suspect class, the Court has in effect
decided to tolerate a considerable amount of sex discrimination. The ERA would provide
an alternate method of eradicating sex discrimination since passage of this constitutional
amendment would prohibit all discrimination on the basis of sex.
38. Pieler, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 8 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 413, 428
(1976). See K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 106-07 (1974) (discussion of "one-way" suspect classification in sex
discrimination cases).
39. See Pieler, supra note 38, at 429. Despite Frontiero, sex-based differentials still per-
vade the rules governing the military service. See Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and
the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973).
40. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
41. FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (Supp. 1974-75).
42. 416 U.S. at 355.
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greatest hardship. 3 Since the job market had been inhospitable to women
seeking any but the lowest paid jobs,44 the Court justified the gender dis-
tinction as compensatory discrimination45 designed to recompense women
for economic discrimination in the marketplace. 6
The Kahn decision retarded the progress made by Reed and Frontiero
by purporting to help women,47 when in reality the majority's reliance
upon the concept of compensatory discrimination reinforced traditional
perceptions of men and women.48 The ironic result of this judicial regres-
sion was to reverse the usual pattern of discrimination by making men
equal victims with women.4 9 Nevertheless, one year later the Supreme
Court applied a compensatory rationale to support a discriminatory stat-
ute in Schlesinger v. Ballard.5"
In Ballard, a male lieutenant in the United States Navy asserted that the
43. Id
44. Id at 353.
45. Compensatory discrimination provides a means for the Court to sustain ameliora-
tive state statutes. Unfortunately, judicial acceptance of these "benign" classifications re-
sults in the disparate treatment of men and women on the basis of sex with total disregard
for their individual capabilities. See generally Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A
New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1,
13-14 (1975).
46. 416 U.S. at 354-56. There is a great deal of controversy over whether a less strict
constitutional standard should be applied when the legislation in question is ameliorative in
nature, thereby discriminating in favor of women. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court - 1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 235, 260 (1976); Pieler, supra note 38, at 428-
29; Note, Preferential Economic Treatmentfor Women.: Some Constitutional and Practical
Implications ofKahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REV. 843, 862 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pref-
erential Economic Treatment].
Despite the Court's reliance upon compensatory discrimination in Kahn, the Court did
not consider it an affirmative action case. On the same day that Kahn was decided, however,
the Court was directly confronted with the question of affirmative action in a racial context
in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), but failed to address it. See Note, Constitu-
tional Law - Tax Exemption for Widows Upheld Over Sex Discrimination Challenge, 53
N.C.L. REV. 551, 556 (1975). For a discussion of the application of affirmative action in
gender cases, see Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Class!fication in the Context ofSex, 10
CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978). See also notes 104-16 and accompanying text infra.
47. The dissent advocated the use of a strict scrutiny analysis. 416 U.S. at 357 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized the majority's application of the compensa-
tory discrimination rationale because the statutory inclusion of widows of substantial
economic means within the class of beneficiaries did not further the state's interest in reme-
dying the economic effects of past discrimination against women. Such a statute should not
be sustained, Justice Brennan argued, because the alleged state interest could be served
equally well by a more narrowly drawn statute. Id at 359-60.
48. See Monaghan, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
100 (1975). See also Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court, 1971-1974, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 617, 670 (1974).
49. See Preferential Economic Treatment, supra note 46, at 876-77.
50. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
[Vol. 29:427
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statutory discharge provisions allowing a longer term of service for female
naval officers than for their male counterparts5' deprived him of equal
protection guaranteed under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.5 2 Unlike Reed and Frontiero, when the majority in Ballard applied
the rational relationship test, they found that the different treatment of
male and female officers was not based upon "overbroad generaliza-
tions"53 but upon the demonstrable fact that male and female officers were
not similarly situated. Congress had specifically provided that "women
may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat mis-
sions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than
hospital ships or transports."54 This restriction precluded women from
compiling naval service records comparable to their male counterparts.
The governmental interest in compensating women for their more limited
promotion opportunities provided the Court with ample justification for
the disparate treatment.
55
Finding nothing in the statutory scheme or legislative history to support
the majority's contention that Congress enacted the legislation to remedy
the disadvantages to women in the Navy, the dissent concluded that the
challenged statute served no compelling government interest.56 Justice
Brennan criticized the Court for "conjuring up a legislative purpose which
may have underlain the gender based distinction here attacked." 57 Using
51. The pertinent discharge law provided for a strict "up or out" system for male of-
ficers who failed to be promoted, 10 U.S.C. § 6382(a) (1962), but guaranteed female officers
13 years before mandatory discharge for lack of promotion. Id § 6401(a). After nine years
of active service as a commissioned officer, appellant failed for a second time to be selected
for promotion to lieutenant commander and was therefore subject to mandatory discharge.
419 U.S. at 499.
52. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
53. 419 U.S. at 507-08. The statutes in both Reed and Frontiero were based on over-
broad generalizations. In Reed, the Idaho statute assumed that men would be better estate
administrators, while in Frontiero it was assumed that women, not men, were dependents.
See notes 29-30, 36-37 supra.
54. 419 U.S. at 508 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970)).
55. 419 U.S. at 508. But see Johnston, supra note 46, at 240-41.
56. 419 U.S. at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 511 (emphasis in original). Under the early "minimum rationality" standard
used by the Supreme Court, hypothesizing legitimate legislative purposes was permitted.
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), in which the Court
stated:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro-
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of facts made known or generally as-
sumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
In a footnote, Justice Stone recognized that there may be a "narrower scope for the opera-
1980]
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the strict scrutiny analysis enunciated in Frontiero, the dissent found that
the legislative classification did not serve compelling interests that could
not be otherwise achieved.58
As in Reed and Kahn, the Supreme Court in Ballard failed to recognize
that the sole justification for the challenged statute was a sex-role stereo-
type.59 However, the Ballard Court went even further than Kahn in seek-
ing out a sex-neutral justification, relying upon an analysis of the statute's
legislative history to find the existence of a questionable statutory purpose.
In this respect, the Ballard decision created even greater confusion con-
cerning the proper mode of analysis in gender-based cases, particularly
with regard to the use of the compensatory discrimination rationale.6"
Unfortunately, during the remainder of the 1974 term, the Supreme
Court had no further opportunity to invoke, and hence clarify, the com-
pensatory discrimination rationale in its consideration of gender-based
classifications. In Taylor v. Louisiana,61 a male plaintiff convicted of ag-
gravated kidnapping by an all-male jury, appealed his case on the grounds
that Louisiana's constitutional and statutory requirements62 excluding wo-
men from jury service violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights. 63 Rejecting the argument that jury service would substantially in-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." 304 U.S. at
152 n.4. See also notes 10-26 and accompanying text supra.
58. 419 U.S. at 511. It has been suggested that the differential challenged by Lt. Ballard
may have operated to the advantage of men by allowing them to get a headstart on accruing
severance pay and other benefits. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 13. See also note 23 and
accompanying text supra.
59. Due to the structure of the service, men and women did not directly compete with
each other; therefore, women could not be disadvantaged in their opportunity for promotion
by the fact that their duties may be more limited than those of men. 419 U.S. at 518 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1976) (inducting men
but not women into the armed services pursuant to the Military Selective Service Act, 50
App. U.S.C. §§ 451-473 (1976), does not deny due process or equal protection to men since
there is a clear and rational relationship between the government's legitimate interests as
expressed in the Act and classifications by sex).
60. Johnston, supra note 46, at 244.
61. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
62. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41; LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 402 (West 1967). Ac-
cording to these provisions, women would not be called for jury duty unless they filed a
declaration of their willingness to serve. Out of a venire of 175 persons drawn for jury
service in Taylor, there was not one woman. 419 U.S. at 523-24.
63. U.S. CONsT. amends. VI & XIV. This was not the first time the Supreme Court had
considered the question of sex discrimination in jury service. See Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261 (1947) (partial exclusion of women from general and special jury panels is not a
denial of due process); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (women may not be
excluded from panels of grand and petit jurors in federal criminal case); Glasser v. United
[Vol. 29:427
Sexual Equality
terfere with a woman's distinctive role in society, the Court reversed Tay-
lor's conviction solely on the ground that the all-male venire violated his
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.64 By narrowing its holding to
the sixth amendment the Court avoided addressing the troublesome equal
protection issue raised by the plaintiff.65
Accordingly, the Taylor decision provided little, if any, guidance regard-
ing the proper standard of review in sex discrimination cases. This judicial
reluctance to address the equal protection issue indicated the difficulty the
Court was experiencing in directly confronting the problems of gender-
based discrimination. Despite this judicial reticence, Taylor did serve the
dual purpose of altering society's perception of women by allowing wo-
men to sit on juries while at the same time ensuring both men and women
that juries would more accurately reflect a cross section of their communi-
ties. Yet, during its 1974 term, the Supreme Court perpetuated the analyti-
cal confusion bred by Taylor and its progenitor cases by its decision in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.66
In Wiesenfeld, a widower challenged denial of survivors' benefits under
the Social Security Act after the death of his wife whose salary had pro-
vided the principal source of income for their family.6 7 Although Social
Security taxes had been deducted from his wife's salary, the statute allo-
cated benefits from her earnings only to her minor children whereas bene-
fits from a deceased husband's earnings would pass to both his widow and
minor children.6" In allowing the widower's claim for benefits, the Court
did not rely upon the compensatory discrimination rationales of Kahn and
Ballard. However, the Court determined that the gender-based distinction
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (where Illinois law providing that jurors in federal courts must
include women became effective one month before an all-male jury was impanelled from
jury lists omitting women, no violation found because of the short time between effective
date of the law and the summoning of grand jury); notes 20-22 and accompanying text
.supra.
64. 419 U.S. at 526, 535-37.
65. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra. While the majority in Taylor did over-
come the presumption raised as a defense in Hoyt that the "woman is still the center of
home and family life," they did not expressly overrule Hoyt, thereby raising questions as to
the applicability of the decision outside of the criminal context.
66. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 40 2(g) (1976). On October 30, 1979 the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Co., 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3283 (Oct. 30, 1979) to consider whether Missouri's policy of denying widowers
the same workmen's compensation death benefits that it pays to widows, discriminates
against men on the basis of sex.
68. 420 U.S. at 637-38. At present, husbands and aged widowers of covered workers
may receive benefits if they were dependent upon their wives for more than one-half of their
support. 42 U.S.C. § 402(c), (f) (1976).
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made by the statute was indistinguishable from that invalidated in Fron-
dero.69 In the Court's first unanimous sex discrimination decision since
Reed, Justice Brennan found that the statutes in both Frontiero and Wie-
senfeld were based upon the overbroad social generalization that women
have a dependent social role. Therefore, the applicable statute in Wiesen-
feld, like the classification in Frontiero, could not withstand scrutiny under
the fifth amendment.7°
As in Frontiero, the female, rather than her dependents, was treated as
the principal victim of the discrimination. 7' Despite the factual similarity
with Frontiero, however, the Court refused to apply a strict scrutiny test
and instead relied upon Reed's rational relationship test. The majority
concluded that the statute provided dissimilar treatment to men and wo-
men who were similarly situated,72 and it ultimately discriminated against
the surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving par-
ent.73 Wiesenfeld confronted the Court with a situation virtually indistin-
guishable from Frontiero,"t yet the Court refused to engage in a strict
scrutiny analysis, perhaps eliminating once and for all the possibility of
using this analysis in gender classification cases. Furthermore, the Court
did not attach any significance to the compensatory discrimination argu-
ment articulated in Kahn and Ballard, determining that "the mere recita-
tion of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme. ' 75
Wiesenfeld undercut traditional attitudes regarding sex roles by ac-
cepting the reality of the working woman and by providing her family with
the same employment protection accorded to the families of working
men.76 Moreover, the decision was a victory for men since it chipped away
69. 420 U.S. at 642, 653.
70. Id at 643-53. In some ways the classification in Wiesenfeld was more pernicious
because, unlike in Frontiero, Mr. Wiesenfeld had no opportunity to demonstrate that he was
dependent on his wife. Furthermore, Ms. Wiesenfeld paid social security taxes into a fund
from which she could not derive the same benefits as men. Id at 645.
71. See generaly Griffiths, Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 534 (1974).
72. 420 U.S. at 653.
73. The legislative purpose of the Act was to provide children deprived of one parent
the opportunity to enjoy the personal attention of the other parent. Therefore, there was no
rational relationship between the classification and the purpose of the statute. Id at 651,
653.
74. Both the Frontiero and Wiesenfeld statutes presumed the dependency of wives on
their husbands. Id at 643. For a discussion of Frontiero, see notes 32-39 and accompanying
text supra.
75. 420 U.S. at 648.
76. In 1977, women who worked full-time year-round earned an average of about 60
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at the singular perception of the male as breadwinner and provided them
with the choice of working or remaining at home to care for their chil-
dren.7 7 Although the Court did depart from its compensatory discrimina-
tion rationale, it nevertheless maintained its recalcitrance by failing to
articulate conclusively a standard for equal protection review. Absent a
clear standard of review, the gains for men and women by decisions such
as Wiesenfeld hang in a precarious balance.
The final gender classification case the Court considered during its 1974
term was Stanton v. Stanton.78 Before the Court was a Utah statute speci-
fying an older age of majority for males than for females. Since the law
required parental support payments only until the children reached the age
of majority, the effect of the statute was to deny daughters the same
parental financial protection guaranteed to sons.79
Rather than evading the equal protection issue, the majority expressly
applied the Reed rational relationship test.8 ° By analyzing the state's ster-
eotyped justifications that "it is the man's responsibility to provide a
home" and that "girls tend to mature physically, emotionally and mentally
before boys,"'" the Court determined that there was nothing rational in the
distinction drawn by the statute since it imposed "criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of the statute."82 Specific acknowledgments by the Court
of the changing role of the woman in society83 and of the need for equal
cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts. Women's median earnings were
$8600 compared to a median salary of $14,600 for men. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. 547, No. 3, EMPLOYMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: WORKING WOMEN
(October 1978). See generally Comment, Teaching Woman Her Place. The Role of Public
Education in the Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1973).
77. See notes 8, 9 and accompanying text supra.
78. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
79. Id at 15. Mr. and Mrs. Stanton were divorced in 1973. Mr. Stanton agreed to
provide support for his son and daughter until they reached the age of majority. The Utah
Code provided that the age of majority for men was 21 while for women it was 18. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). As a result, sons would receive greater financial assistance than
daughters. 421 U.S. at 8-10.
80. 421 U.S. at 13. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
81. 421 U.S. at 10.
82. Id at 14.
83. The Court stated:
Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. Coeduca-
tion is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the professions,
in government and, indeed in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not
always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice
... .. To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is to be self serving:
if the female is not to be supported as long as the male, she hardly can be expected
to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier
coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.
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opportunities for men and women were important steps toward the Court's
recognizing the need for a clear standard of review in sex discrimination
cases. Stanton marked the end of the Supreme Court's constant equivoca-
tion in such cases. The majority held that governmentally imposed gender
classifications violate equal protection guarantees when the classification
can only be justified with traditional sex-role stereotypes. The Court
stated that under any test - compelling state interest, rational basis, or
something in between - the Utah statute could not survive constitutional
attack because of its irrational distinction between the sexes.84 This fore-
casted the emergence of the "something in between" test articulated during
the 1976 term in Craig v. Boren.85
B. Supreme Court - 1976 Term: The Emergence of a New Standard of
Review
Craig concerned an Oklahoma statute 86 prohibiting the sale of "non-
intoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to fe-
males under the age of eighteen. The law was challenged as a denial of
equal protection to males between the ages of eighteen and twenty. In-
stead of applying Reed's rational relationship test, however, the majority
embarked upon a heightened scrutiny of the classification derived from
previous sex discrimination cases. Justice Brennan stated that "classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."87 While the
Court did not expressly endorse a "middle tier" of scrutiny, the concurring
and dissenting opinions determined this to be the obvious implication of
the Court's decision.
88
Id at 15. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975).
84. 421 U.S. at 17.
85. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig was the first successful challenge by a male in a sex
discrimination suit. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
86. OKLA. STAT., tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 & Supp. 1976).
87. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
88. Justice Powell, in concurrence, stated:
As has been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be viewed by
some as a "middle tier" approach. While I would not endorse that characterization
and would not welcome a further subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor
compels the recognition that the relatively deferential "rational basis" standard of
review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based
classification.
Id at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for
enunciating the standard that "classification by gender must serve important government
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives," without
citation to any source. Id at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See
Karst, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 178 (1977).
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Statistical surveys were introduced to provide support for the classifica-
tion, showing that more males than females were arrested for drunk driv-
ing.89 Nevertheless, the majority determined that the relationship between
gender and traffic safety was too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that
gender-based difference be substantially related to the achievement of the
statutory objective.90 Consequently, the Court struck down the statute as
invidiously discriminating against males.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for favoring men by
invoking a stricter standard of judicial review where the statute resulted in
less favorable treatment of men than women.9' However, Justice Rehn-
quist's criticisms were premature. It remained to be seen whether this
heightened level of scrutiny would be applied exclusively to sex discrimi-
nation cases initiated by males challenging gender-based classifications.92
Although Justice Rehnquist viewed the decision as providing a benefit to
men, in reality the decision benefitted both men and women by advocating
equal treatment without regard to sex.
The test developed in Craig was reaffirmed in Califano v. Goldfarb93
when the Court struck down a provision of the Social Security Act 94 pro-
viding survivors' benefits to widows but not to widowers unless they had
received at least one-half of their support from their deceased wives. Writ-
89. 429 U.S. at 200.
90. Id at 204.
91. Id at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. There has been some discussion by commentators whether the same test should be
applied by the Court in scrutinizing classifications based upon sex regardless of which sex is
discriminated against. See notes 38, 46 and accompanying text supra. The middle-tier anal-
ysis developed in Craig has been regularly applied by the Court to male challenges to dis-
criminatory state statutes. See Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 99 S.
Ct. 1102 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977). See also notes 93-145 and accompanying text infra. However, during its 1978
term, the Court applied the middle-tier Craig test where the challenge was brought by a
woman in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979). Here, the Court held that a
Massachusetts veterans' preference law did not discriminate against women in violation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause but instead made a distinction between
veterans and nonveterans, the latter category including men and women alike. This applica-
tion of the Craig test to a female challenge is an indication that this heightened level of
scrutiny is not reserved exclusively for male challenges to gender-based statutes but is a
uniform test to be applied to discrimination against either sex. See also notes 146-52 and
accompanying text infra. The Feeney Court's distinction between veterans and nonveterans
is reminiscent of a similar distinction made by the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 n. 10 (1974), where it found that an employment disability insurance plan not provid-
ing funds for pregnancy did not discriminate against women because the distinction made
by the plan was between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, the latter category
including both men and women.
93. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1976).
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ing for a plurality of four, Justice Brennan found the gender-based classifi-
cation indistinguishable from Wiesenfeld and Frontiero. By providing the
working female with less protection for her family than that of the male
wage earner even if their family needs are identical, the statute discrimi-
nated against the female wage earner in violation of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.95 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected
arguments for administrative convenience and compensatory discrimina-
tion as justification for the discrimination. 96 To determine the "actual pur-
poses" of the discrimination, the majority examined the legislative history
of the statute and concluded that Congress did not create the disparity
between nondependent widows and widowers with a compensatory pur-
pose.97 Rather, it had intended to grant benefits on the basis of depen-
dency and not need.98 Therefore, the argument for compensatory
discrimination had no logical foundation, and the analytical problems cre-
ated by Kahn and Ballard were easily avoided by the Court. 99
The Goldfarb plurality found that the statute, by presuming the depen-
dency of wives, reflected "archaic and overbroad" generalizations" and
therefore provided insufficient justification for gender-based discrimina-
tion in the distribution of employment-related benefits.' ° ' In both Gold-
farb and Wiesenfeld, the Court refused to focus its equal protection
analysis upon the surviving widower, regarding the covered female wage
earner as the primary victim of the discrimination since she was in effect
penalized for working.10 2 Nevertheless, by providing widowers with the
same benefits surviving widows received, regardless of their status, the
Court gave positive support for the equal treatment of men and women in
the labor market.1
0 3
After Goldfarb, it appeared that the Court was developing a new stan-
95. See note 4 supra.
96. 430 U.S. at 212-17.
97. Id at 216.
98. Id at 213.
99. See Karst, supra note 88, at 179-80.
100. But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (the different treatment of
male and female naval officers under 10 U.S.C. §§ 6382, 6401 (1970) reflected not "archaic
and overbroad generalizations, but instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional
service").
101. 430 U.S. at 217.
102. Id at 207-09. But see id at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("relevant discrimination
in this case is against surviving male spouses, rather than against deceased female wage
earners"). See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
103. One commentator regards Wiesenfeld as the first step and Goldfarb as the second
step in a litigation campaign to advance the Frontiero judgment and contain the Kahn deci-
sion. See Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 819.
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dard of analysis, moving further away from compensatory discrimination
and traditional sex-role assumptions and closer to a heightened standard
of review. But rather than continuing development along this vein, the
Court seemingly retreated from its progression in Califano v. Webster.'"
In this case, the Court upheld a formula for social security retirement ben-
efits, effective from 1956 to 1972, providing more favorable benefit pay-
ments to retired women than to retired men with the same past earnings.' 0 5
What appeared to be a retreat to Kahn and Ballard, however, was in es-
sence the judicial response to the question of affirmative action in the con-
text of gender. 10 6 Applying the Craig test and Goldfarb analysis in aper
curiam opinion,'0 7 the Court determined that the challenged statutory
scheme was more analogous to those upheld in Kahn and Ballard than
those struck down in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb.' °8 In contrast to Goldfarb
and F4esenfeld, the challenged statutory provision was not based on a "ro-
mantically paternalistic" view of women but served as a specific response
to the discrimination and attempted to remedy it.'° 9 Therefore, the Court
concluded that when legislation directly addresses discrimination and tries
to remedy it, disparate treatment of the sexes for a determined amount of
time is constitutional."' 0 With this decision, the Court created a rather fine
distinction between compensatory discrimination adopted by the legisla-
ture for remedial reasons and compensatory discrimination based upon
traditional stereotypes, tolerating the former but not the latter."' Despite
this fine distinction, the use of the compensatory rationale in any form
ultimately reinforces traditional male-female role models" 12 by creating
104. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
105. Ch. 809, § 215, 64 Stat. 506 (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1976)). For
cases in which courts have upheld social security and retirement benefit provisions accord-
ing women more favorable benefit computation than men, see Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390
F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968); Polelle v. HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443 (N.D.
Ill. 1974) (mem.); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 1050 (1975).
106. See Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 822. See also note 46 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Karst, supra note 88, at 178-80.
108. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317.
109. Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 823.
110. 430 U.S. at 318-20. In 1972, Congress phased out this differential by extending to
men the three low earning years' exclusion once reserved for women. This action was taken
soon after the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were enacted. Ginsburg, Women, Equality & the
Bakke Case, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 8, 13 (1977).
il1. See Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 823. But see Comment, But Some Animals Are
More Equal Than Others- A Look at the Equal Protection Argument Against Minority Prefer-
ences, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 580 (1973) (one result of preferential systems is discrimination
against nonminorities).
112. See notes 45, 48 and accompanying text supra.
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the impression that women cannot get ahead without paternalistic legisla-
tion,"' and by reinforcing systems in which men do not receive the same
benefits as their female counterparts.
The continued viability of the distinction created by the Court between
the two different types of compensatory discrimination is presently uncer-
tain. It is clear, however, that the use of a middle-level analysis is only
marginally effective as long as the Court may resort to compensatory dis-
crimination as a justification for gender classifications. By using different
standards of review, depending upon whether the discrimination is for or
against women or men, 1 4 the Court misses the point that all discrimina-
tion, whether compensatory or not, has a deleterious effect upon men and
women." 5 Unless the Court further defines the factors used in the middle-
tier analysis and describes how these factors are to be weighed, "the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny will remain a mask for an unexplained process of
adjudication."" 6
C The Supreme Court - 1978 Term: Altering Perceptions of the Male's
Role in Society
During the 1978 term, the Supreme Court continued to use the middle-
tier approach as it scrutinized gender-based statutes regarding alimony, 1
7
the rights of the putative father,"l8 and parental eligibility for AFDC bene-
fits,' 19 and as a result made significant inroads for men and women in the
area of family law. In Orr v. Orr,2° a divorced man challenged the con-
stitutionality of Alabama's alimony statutes' 2' authorizing the courts to
require husbands but not wives to pay alimony. 122 Using the middle-tier
113. See Johnston, supra note 48, at 670.
114. At the close of the 1976 term the "middle-level" analysis had only been applied to
male challenges to gender classifications, see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per
curiam); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
whereas prior female challenges had been scrutinized under Reed's rational basis test. See
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
115. See Erickson, supra note 45, at 53.
116. Karst, supra note 88, at 188.
117. Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
118. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
119. Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979). The Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program (AFDC) provides financial assistance to families with needy dependent
children. Participating states administer the program in conformity with federal standards,
financed by the federal government and the states on a matching-funds basis. See note 147
infra.
120. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
121. ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 30-2-51, -53 (1975).
122. 99 S. Ct. at 1107. The Orrs were divorced in February, 1974, and Mr. Orr was
directed to pay $1240 per month in alimony. In July, 1976, Mrs. Orr initiated a contempt
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analysis articulated in Craig,'23 the Court held that the Alabama statutory
scheme violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1
24
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, examined three possible gov-
ernmental objectives which could arguably be served by Alabama's statu-
tory scheme. Rejecting the valid state interest 125 and administrative
convenience arguments, 126 the Court found that the statute failed to serve
an important governmental objective. Also, the Court noted that the gen-
der classification drawn by the statute produced perverse results by giving
an advantage only to the financially secure wife whose husband is in
need.127 The compensatory discrimination rationale also failed to provide
support for the gender classification since women had not been signifi-
cantly discriminated against, with respect to opportunities, in the sphere to
which the statute applied the sex-based classification. 28 Not only did the
Court reject the application of a compensatory discrimination rationale to
the facts of this particular case, but it specifically recognized that gender-
based legislative classifications "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing ste-
reotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special pro-
tection."' 29 Given this negative effect, the Court recommended the careful
tailoring of statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and amelio-
rate the effects of past discrimination. 3 °
proceeding against Mr. Orr, alleging that his alimony payments were in arrears. At the
hearing on Mrs. Orr's petition, Mr. Orr submitted a defense motion questioning the constitu-
tionality of the statute.
123. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
124. The Court expressly recognized that classifications discriminating against men are
also subject to scrutiny. 99 S. Ct. at I11.
125. The Court found that Alabama's desire to reinforce a family role model which char-
acterizes the wife as a dependent family member was not a valid state interest. Id.
126. The Court determined that there was no reason to use sex as a proxy for need since
needy males as well as needy females could be helped along with "little if any additional
burden on the State." Id at 1112-13.
127. Id. at 1113. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 221 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (where survivors' benefits were paid to the wife regardless of her dependency,
but paid to the husband only if he received one half of his support from his wife, such
disparate treatment only benefitted those wives who were not dependent on their husbands).
128. 99 S. Ct. at 1112-13. Women traditionally have been accorded preferential treat-
ment under alimony laws premised upon assumptions of dependency. See L. KANOWITZ,
WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 69 (1969). See generally Podell,
Peck & First, Custody - To Which Parent? 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 52 (1972).
129. 99 S. Ct. at 1113.
130. The Court noted that where "the state's compensatory and ameliorative purposes
are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender-classifies and there-
fore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to clas-
sify on the basis of sex." Id.
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By advocating the allocation of alimony obligations on the basis of need,
the decision provided men with the opportunity to receive alimony. This
signified a substantial departure from traditional sex roles by freeing wo-
men from stereotypical dependence and providing dependent men with
the same benefits accorded women upon the termination of the marital
relationship.'' Moreover, the Court's qualified denouncement of the
compensatory rationale reinforces its conclusion in Webster that only sta-
tutes speciftcal/y designed to compensate women for past discrimination
are constitutionally permissible.
132
One month later, the Court decided Caban v. Mohammed,'3 3 holding
unconstitutional a New York statute requiring the consent of the unmar-
ried mother but not the unmarried father in an adoption proceeding.
Caban and Mohammed lived together for four years and, though never
legally married, had two children. Caban identified himself as the father
on each child's birth certificate, lived with the children, and provided sup-
port for them. One year after Caban and Mohammed separated, Moham-
med married another man; however, Caban continued to see and
communicate with his children. When Mohammed and her husband
sought to legally adopt the children, Caban cross-petitioned for the adop-
tion of his children. The Court granted Mohammed's petition for adop-
tion, despite Caban's withholding of consent, thereby cutting off all of
Caban's parental rights and obligations.' 34 The majority found the dis-
tinction between the rights of unmarried mothers and the rights of unmar-
ried fathers not substantially related to an important state interest.
Mohammed's refusal to consent to Caban's adoption of his children took
away all of Caban's parental rights to his children whereas the natural
father's consent to adoption by Mohammed was not a legal necessity. 135
In Caban, the Court once again applied the Craig test to a male chal-
lenge.136 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, examined whether a sub-
131. In more than half (24.8 million) of all two-parent families, wives had earnings in
1977, and their average median contribution to family income was $5100. This rose to
$8600, or 38% of family income, when wives were employed full-time all year. See U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. 551, No. 4, EMPLOYMENT IN PER-
SPECTIVE: WORKING WOMEN (January 1978). In 1976, 74.6% of the divorced women were
in the labor force. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. WORK-
ING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 27 (1977).
132. See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
133. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979). See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
134. 99 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
135. Caban also contended that the Court's holding in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relation-
ship with their children, absent a finding that they are unfit as parents. 99 S. Ct. at 1764.
136. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
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stantial relationship existed between the purported state interest of
promoting the adoption of illegitimate children and the sexual classifica-
tion of the New York statute.'37 Not only did the Court require a showing
of a substantial relationship, but the distinction made had to be structured
in such a way as to reasonably further those ends.'38 The Court distin-
guished between cases in which the father had never come forward to par-
ticipate in the rearing of his child' 3 9 and cases in which the father had
established a substantial relationship with the children and admitted his
paternity, 4 ° finding that in the latter case, the unwed father's consent was
warranted. 4 '
In concluding that the New York statute was an example of "overbroad
generalizations" in gender-based classifications, the majority did not even
address the two principal justifications of compensatory discrimination
and administrative convenience relied upon in previous cases142 to sustain
statutes. In dissent, Justice Stewart found that when unwed mothers and
unwed fathers are not similarly situated, the equal protection clause is not
violated.143 In this case, however, the unwed father had established a pa-
ternal relationship with his children and was similarly situated to the un-
wed mother. Despite this fact, Justice Stewart, applying the "best-
interests-of-the-child" standard to the case, concluded that the legislative
137. 99 S. Ct. at 1767.
138. Id In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals considered In re Adoption of
Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E. 2d 486 (1975), app. dismissedfor want ofa substan-
tial federal question sub nora. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976), in which the court rea-
soned that people wishing to adopt a child born out of wedlock would be discouraged if the
natural father could prevent the adoption by withholding his consent since in many in-
stances the unavailability of the father could cause interminable delays. See generally Note,
Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection - Rights of the Unwed Father
- Consent to Adoption, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312 (1976); Recent Development, 4 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 473 (1976).
139. See note 141 infra.
140. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
141. See Tabler, Parental Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on
Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231 (1971). See also Comment, The Emerging
Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MicH. L. REV. 1581,
1590 (1972). But see Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979). In Parham a father chal-
lenged a Georgia statute which precluded him from bringing a wrongful death action for the
death of his child if he had not legitimated the child. The Court held that the statutory
classification was a rational means for dealing with the problem of proving paternity and did
not reflect any overbroad generalizations about men as a class. See also Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (Georgia code provision that only the mother's consent is required for
the adoption of an illegitimate child if the natural father has not legitimated the child does
not deny the father equal protection).
142. See notes 125-30 and accompanying text supra.
143. 99 S. Ct. at 1771.
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goal of the statute - to facilitate adoptions that are in the best interests of
the illegitimate children - is fairly served by the gender-based classifica-
tion" since requiring the consent of both parents might result in illegiti-
mate children remaining illegitimate.
As in Orr, the Caban decision invalidated a state statute based on a
gender classification discriminating against men. 145 Here, as in previous
male challenges, the Court continued to develop a middle-tier analysis re-
quiring a heightened level of scrutiny. In Calfano v. Westcott, 4 6 however,
the Court applied this heightened level of scrutiny in considering a female
challenge to section 407 of the Social Security Act.1
47
In Westcott, the challenged statutory scheme provided benefits to fami-
lies whose dependent children had been deprived of parental support be-
cause of the unemployment of the father but did not provide comparable
benefits when the mother became unemployed. 148 Applying the Craig test,
the Court found that the legislative distinction was based solely on the sex
of the parent and therefore discriminated against families in which the
female spouse was the wage earner.' 49 As in Wiesenfeld, the deprivation
imposed by the statute had a more pernicious effect since it was not merely
a procedural barrier like the proof-of-dependency requirement in Fron-
144. Id at 1773. The best interest of the child theory was articulated by Justice Cardozo
in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925):
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction . . . does not proceed upon the theory
that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the
other or indeed against anyone. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the
interest of the child. . . . He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary
parties, to compose their private differences. He is not determining rights "as be-
tween a parent and a child" or as between one parent and another .... Equity
does not concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its
concern is for the child.
See generally Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423 (1964).
145. During the 1978 term, the Supreme Court also considered Duren v. Missouri, 99 S.
Ct. 664 (1979), a male challenge to a Missouri state statute. Relying upon their decision in
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court held that a Missouri law allowing wo-
men to be exempted from jury service upon their request, resulting in an average of less than
15% of women on jury venires in the forum county, violated the "fair cross-section" require-
ment of the sixth amendment. The Duren Court, like the Taylor Court, did not address the
equal protection issue.
146. 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979). See also note 92 and accompanying text supra.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976). Section 407 of the Social Security Act governs the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program.
148. 99 S. Ct. at 2657-58. Appellees were two couples who satisfied all the requirements
for AFDC-UF benefits except for the requirement that the unemployed parent be the father.
In both cases, the woman had been the family breadwinner before losing her job and would
have qualified the family for benefits had she been male. Id at 2658-59.
149. Id. at 2660-61. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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liero and Goldfarb but acted as an absolute bar to qualification for aid.'5 °
After examining the legislative history of the statute, the Court con-
cluded that the statutory classification was not substantially related to the
statutory goal of reducing the father's incentive to desert. Rather, the dis-
tinction was based upon sexual stereotypes presuming the father as bread-
winner and the mother as homemaker.' 5 ' The use of the middle-tier test
in Westcou perhaps signals the consistent application of the test to all sex
discrimination cases.
Both Caban and Orr provided men with increased rights in the area of
family law and altered some of the traditional assumptions attached to
male and female family responsibilities. Similarly, Westcott recognized
that women have a function apart from raising a family, for in many cases
they bear the primary responsibility for the support of their families.' 52
The effect of judicial recognition that men may be more financially in need
than women or that men have a right to withhold their consent in the
adoption of their illegitimate children has helped to redefine the male
function within the family unit while also providing more flexibility for
perceptions of the woman's role.
At the close of the 1978 term, the Court had adopted the middle-tier
analysis for all gender-discrimination cases. The strict scrutiny analysis
used by the Court in Frontiero '53 appears to have been a mere aberration
in the Court's consideration of gender classifications. This judicial reluc-
tance to regard sex as a suspect class along the lines of race and national
origin has produced a line of cases often difficult to reconcile. '54 While the
middle tier offers some standard of analysis, specific factors used by the
Court in its determination are unclear.' 55 On the other hand, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'56 prohibiting discrimination in employment
150. 99 S. Ct. at 2661. See also note 70 and accompanying text supra.
151. Id at 2663.
152. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 23, 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
154. See generally Emden, Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimination Cases.- Legal
Perpetuation of Traditional Myths, 43 ALH. L. REV. 73 (1978); Comment, The Supreme Court
1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications." Avoiding A Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 375 (1975); Note, The Searchfor a Standard of Review in Sex Discrimination Ques-
dons, 14 Hous. L. REV. 721 (1977); Note, The Supreme Court Avoids Considering Sex-based
Classfications, 55 NEB. L. REV. 133 (1975).
155. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
156. Title VII is the "equal employment opportunity" section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... with respect to
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on the basis of sex, provides victims of discrimination with a more certain
alternative avenue for relief.
II. TITLE VII - AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR ACHIEVING SEXUAL
EQUALITY
With the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, individ-
uals dissatisfied with the Court's "minimum rationality" approach to gen-
der cases, were provided with an additional right of action in employment
cases. 157 Title VII, in conjunction with the Equal Pay Act of 1963,158 stat-
utorily supplemented the protection afforded by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments by mandating equal treatment in every phase of the employ-
ment relationship. 5 9 Since Title VII's prohibition of discrimination in
employment reaches both state and private action, as opposed to the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, which reach only governmental action, the
Act may be enforced either by the federal government or by an individual
suing on his or her own behalf. 6 '
The Act does not specifically prohibit discrimination against women but
instead extends its protection to all persons. It provides women with an
effective means of attacking "protective" labor legislation' 6 ' and also of-
fers men a means of challenging gender-based discrimination in the areas
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a) (1976).
157. See note 160 and accompanying text infra.
158. Enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act
requires "equal wages for equal work." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
159. Title IX of the Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 similarly
prohibits sex discrimination in any educational program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976). Recently, the United States District
Court for Rhode Island held that Title IX prohibits the exclusion of a male from an all-
female high school volleyball team where there is no male volleyball team. Gomes v. Rhode
Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979). See also Cox, Intercollegiate
Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34 (1977); Comment, The Regulation of Title
IX: Sex Discrimination in Student Affairs, 13 Hous. L. REV. 734 (1976); Note, Sex Discrimi-
nation and Intercollegiate Athletics. Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254
(1979).
160. For a comprehensive examination of the procedures for filing a Title VII lawsuit,
see Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1195 (1971).
161. The limited House debate on the sex amendment to Title VII concentrated upon its
effect on protective state employment legislation. See 110 CONG. REC. 2579-80 (1964).
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of employment and retirement benefits.'62 Unlike the equal protection
standards of review, Title VII requires only that the plaintiff prove that the
challenged employment practice has a disproportionate effect upon a pro-
tected class.' 63  Once this discriminatory effect is proven, the employer
must either revise the employment practice to conform with the mandate
of Title VII or successfully raise the bona fide occupational qualification
defense.
164
A bona fide occupational qualification 165 is a characteristic "reasonably
162. See Preferential Economic Treatment, supra note 46, at 843.
163. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
a discriminatory purpose is not a necessary precondition to liability under Title VII. Once
the plaintiff has established that the challenged employment practice has an "effect" upon
members of a protected class, it is up to the employer to prove that the requirement has a
manifest relationship to the employment in question. Known as the "effects test," this stan-
dard was incorporated into the 1972 amendments to Title VII by the Conference Report of
the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972. See Comment, Sex Discrimination - Distinctions Be-
tween Title VII and Equal Protection - General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
91, 96-97 (1978). The Court has specifically recognized that the constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is not the same as the standard appli-
cable under Title VII. Under Title VII, the complainant need only show that the employ-
ment practice in question has a disproportionate impact upon a particular class of persons
whereas a constitutional challenge requires a showing of discriminatory purpose. Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Since neutral laws do not violate the equal protection
clause so/ely because they result in a racially disproportionate impact, Title VII, by placing a
lighter burden of proof upon the complainant, offers the more attractive alternative for re-
lief.
164. See note 197 infra. An employer has the choice of either providing men with the
same benefits as women or taking those benefits away from women to ensure that both sexes
receive the same employment benefits. But see Comment, Employment Rights of Women in
the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1113 (1977) (outright exclusion of women based on
the assumption that exposure to toxic substances in the workplace threatens the reproductive
health of women more than men cannot be supported under either statutory or judicial
exceptions to Title VII).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) provides in relevant part:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees. . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise. ...
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), responsible for the administra-
tion of Title VII, has construed the bona fide occupational qualification exception quite
narrowly. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1978) (the principle of nondiscrimination re-
quires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capabilities and not on the
basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group). Furthermore, in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) the Supreme Court in its first ruling on the bona fide occu-
pational qualification defense, approved a portion of the EEOC guidelines stating "that the
bfoq [bona fide occupational qualification] exception was in fact meant to be an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex." 433 U.S.
at 334.
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necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular business or enter-
prise. '  When no member of one sex can qualify for a job because the
person lacks unique sex characteristics, the bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation may be used to discriminate on the basis of sex.' 6 7 However, this
provision may only be employed when an individual determination of ca-
pacity would not serve any purpose. For example, the position of wet
nurse or a theatrical part calling for a male or female actress would not
violate Title VII despite its preclusion of members of the opposite sex since
only members of one sex can perform the job."6 In determining whether a
valid bona fide occupational defense has been raised, courts use the "busi-
ness necessity" test providing that "discrimination on the basis of sex is
valid only when the essence of the business operation would be under-
mined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."' 6 9 By employing
the bona fide occupational qualification as a defense, an employer admits
sex discrimination but attempts to justify it.17° Traditionally, the courts
have been reluctant to hold the bona fide occupational qualification as a
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
167. See Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifica-
tion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1977). Since race is omitted from the coverage of the bona
fide occupational qualification, employers may never raise the defense when charged with
racial discrimination but may rely upon it where discrimination is on the basis of religion,
national origin, or sex. See also Note, Equal Rights for Women.- The Role ofAffirmative
Action, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 177, 197 (1977).
168. The EEOC allows hiring of only male or female actresses despite the fact that one
applicant may have the "physical appearance" of a member of the opposite sex. 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(2) (1978).
169. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S 950 (1971).
170. Once a sexually discriminatory practice is proven, the defendant has the burden of
proving his defense. This defense will only be sustained by the court if it can withstand
judicial scrutiny under one of three possible tests advanced in different circuit courts:
(1) "all or substantially all" test: an employer has the burden of proving that
he had reasonable cause to believe, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971);
(2) "essence test" or "business necessity test": discrimination based on sex is
valid only when the essence of the business operation, would be undermined by not
hiring members of one sex exclusively. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
(3) "sexual characteristics test": where sexual characteristics, rather than mere
attributes culturally common to one sex, constitute the basis of the occupational
qualification, there is no need to find a total business disruption. Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
See also Sirota, supra note 167, at 1042. For a general discussion of the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, see Neuberger, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualfication Under
Title VII, 29 LAB. L.J. 425 (1978).
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valid defense; accordingly, Title VII has become a powerful means to bat-
tle sex discrimination in employment. 7 '
The passage of Title VII generated much litigation by women as they
sought equal treatment in, and access to, employment opportunities.
72
Women challenged male-oriented labor practices which reinforced the
traditional notions of women as the weaker sex; 173 however, men also
brought suits under the Act.
174
4. Men Seek 4ccess to Traditionally Female-Dominated Areas
Title VII provided men with the opportunity to gain access to areas of
employment traditionally closed to them. '7 In Diaz v. Pan American
World Airwa"s,'76 for example, a male plaintiff brought a class action
under Title VII challenging employment practices precluding him from
obtaining a job as a flight cabin attendant. Since the defendant admitted
that the plaintiff had been discriminated against on the basis of sex, 17 7 the
Fifth Circuit examined whether a sexual characteristic constituted a bona
fide occupational qualification for the job of flight attendant.' 78 Pan Am
contended that its policy of hiring exclusively females constituted a busi-
ness necessity because women could perform the nonmechanical functions
of the job in a more effective manner than men.1 79 The court disagreed
with Pan Am, concluding that its business operation would not be under-
mined by hiring members of both sexes, and holding that the airline was
therefore in violation of the Act.'
80
Similarly, in Hailes v. United Airlines,' 8' a male filed a Title VII lawsuit
alleging sex discrimination on the part of United Airlines. United placed a
newspaper advertisement for stewardesses under the "Help-Wanted-Fe-
males" column without a corresponding ad in the "Help-Wanted-Males"
column.'8 2 Finding this job listing indicated a preference for females, the
171. See Sirota, supra note 167, at 1042.
172. See Kendrigan, Equal Rights for Men, 12 TRIAL 52 (1976).
173. See note 192 and accompanying text infra.
174. See Kendrigan, supra note 172, at 52.
175. See generally Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
176. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
177. Id at 386.
178. Id at 387. See notes 165-71 and accompanying text supra.
179. 442 F.2d at 388.
180. Id See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(on remand the court allowed the plaintiff back pay damages).
181. 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
182. It is well-settled in the Fifth Circuit that female gender is not a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for the position of airline cabin attendant. Id at 1008 n.2. See notes
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Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine if Hailes
was reasonably inhibited from seeking employment with United.
83
Like the job of flight attendant, the nursing profession has been opened
to men through Title VII litigation. In Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospi-
tal, ' 84 a male registered nurse brought a civil rights action against the hos-
pital. On two separate occasions, Sibley had refused to permit the plaintiff
to attend to female patients before any patients had an opportunity to ac-
cept or reject his services.' 85 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that these actions were a deliberate circumvention
of the safeguards against discrimination established by Title VII and
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.' 6
A contrary result, however, was reached in Fesel v. Masonic Home of
Delaware, Inc. "' in which a male nurse had been denied employment at a
nursing home on the basis of the residents' preference for women. The
court, in its analysis of the bona fide occupational qualification defense,
focused upon case law dealing with those situations in which an employer
refuses to hire members of one sex due to the privacy interests of his clients
or customers, rather than an employee's ability to perform a particular
176-80 and accompanying text supra; accord, EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp.
626 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (policy compelling unpaid maternity leave for pregnant flight attend-
ants constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification; weight restrictions are not based on
immutable characteristics and therefore cannot be challenged under the BFOQ defense).
See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Jarrell v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), a/I'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
183. 464 F.2d at 1009. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1978). In its sex discrimination guide-
lines, the EEOC has taken the position that it is a violation of Title VII for a help wanted ad
to indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless it is a
bona fide occupational qualification for the particular job involved. The EEOC further
states that placement of an advertisement in columns classified by publishers on the basis of
sex, such as columns headed "male" or "female," would be considered an expression of
preference or limitation, specification or discrimination based upon sex.
184. 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1972), rey'd, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
185. The Professional Nurses Registry assigned nurses to job opportunities as they were
phoned in by the hospital or individuals, and assignments were made nondiscriminatorily.
If the assigned nurse was rejected by the patient, the nurse would nevertheless be remuner-
ated for the services that were to be rendered that day. Sibley's rejection of the male nurse
deprived him of the opportunity to be remunerated for his services. 340 F. Supp. at 688.
186. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
that the facts alleged in the complaint required a ruling that an action was maintainable
under Title VII. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It did
not agree, however, that the record justified the district court's sua sponle grant of a sum-
mary judgment since the liability of the hospital under the Act would depend upon the
resolution, at trial of material issues of fact. Id at 1339. Accordingly, the court reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
187. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), a/I'd without opinion, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
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job. 88 When such a defense is raised, the court determined that the em-
ployer's burden is twofold. The employer first must prove that he had a
factual basis for believing that not hiring members of one sex exclusively
would directly undermine the essence of his business. Secondly, he must
show that it would not be possible to assign job responsibilities selectively
so as to minimize clashes between the privacy interests of customers and
the principles of Title VII.' 89 Upon consideration of the employer's evi-
dence, the court held that the home had met its burden of establishing a
bona fide occupational qualification defense based upon the privacy inter-
ests of its guests.' 90
As illustrated by the airline and nursing cases, Title VII protects both
men and women from employment discrimination.' 9 ' But, while access to
employment in traditionally female-dominated professions has helped to
dispel some stereotyped assumptions concerning the "proper" professions
for men and women, mere access has not ensured equality for men or wo-
men, since many employers have insisted upon providing different benefits
to their employees on the basis of sex.
B. Employment Benefits
Many employers have attempted to compensate women for both their
"inferior physical abilities"' 92 and a history of employment discrimination
by instituting retirement plans according different treatment to employees
on the basis of sex.' 93 In Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co. 194
male employees attacked a retirement plan permitting female employees to
retire on full pension at the age of sixty, but requiring men to wait until the
188. Id at 1350.
189. Id at 1351.
190. Id at 1351-54.
191. The Ninth Circuit has held that transsexuals as a class are not within the scope of
Title VII. Giving the statute its plain meaning, Congress had only intended to include the
traditional notions of sex. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson and Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th
Cir. 1977). See Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Em-
ployment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IowA L. REV. 527 (1979) (examination of the
constitutional and statutory questions raised by public and private employment policies that
discriminate on the basis of sexual preference).
192. Women have partially overcome this traditional notion by challenging employment
practices that precluded them from jobs on the basis of their physical constitution. See, e.g.,
Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972) (violation of Title
VII to assume that women as a group cannot work as long hours as men); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (Title VII prohibits the application of the
assumption that women as a class are weaker than men).
193. See notes 194-201 and accompanying text infra.
194. 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973), af'd without opinion, 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976).
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age of sixty-five or to retire at sixty at reduced pensions.'95 The Third
Circuit found the sexually discriminatory retirement benefits to be viola-
tive of Title VII.' 96 Therefore, the men who had retired on reduced pen-
sions were entitled to receive an increase in their benefits to bring their
pensions to the same level as those of similarly situated women.'
97
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in Chastang v. Flynn and
Emrich Co. ,198 when retired male employees brought suit for damages on
the basis of a sexually discriminating retirement plan providing males who
retire early with a smaller share of the retirement fund than similarly situ-
ated female employees.' 99 The defendant company offered a compensa-
tory discrimination justification for the disparate treatment, arguing that
women, because of a lack of physical strength, had been unable to qualify
for the higher paying company jobs involving manual labor. However, the
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument since the compensatory plan did not
extend benefits to female foundry workers who were the lowest paid of the
female employees. Consequently, the court held that there was no busi-
ness necessity to justify the disparate treatment. In contrast to some of the
equal protection cases decided by the Supreme Court,2°o the retirement
cases demonstrate that the compensatory discrimination rationale has no
applicability to a Title VII analysis. Since the prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex is absolute under Title VII, 20 ' compensatory
195. The company initiated the original employment plan in 1911. Although the plan
was revised in May, 1977, it remained discriminatory to the extent that it favored women
hired prior to May 1, 1967. 477 F.2d at 92-93.
196. Id at 93. Under Title VII, retirement benefits are within the "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See also City of
Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (Title VII prohibits unequal contributions by
men and women to employment pension funds); see generally Bernstein & Williams, Title
VII and the Problem of Sex Classocations in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203
(1974). See note 202 infra.
197. 477 F.2d at 96. The court stated that the company was not precluded from raising
men's benefits to the level of women's benefits in order to achieve equality. Such adjust-
ments have been recognized as a proper means to achieve that end. See Hays v. Potlatch
Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
198. 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976).
199. Id at 1041.
200. See notes 40-49, 50-60, 104-16 and accompanying text supra. Paternalistic state
statutes are similar to some of the retirement benefit provisions since they discriminate
against men by providing special treatment for women. In Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F.
Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972), a California law providing 10-minute rest breaks exclusively for
female employees was preempted by Title VII under the supremacy clause. The court found
that such protective legislation, as well as discriminating against men, made women less
desirable for hiring due to the special accommodations the employer must provide for them.
Therefore, such statutes had a discriminatory effect on women as well. Id at 997.
201. See Kendrigan, Reverse Sex Discrimination - The Horns of the Dilemma, 13 TRIAL
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discrimination favoring one sex cannot be tolerated.2 °2
Although dissimilar employment opportunities and benefits for men and
women are clearly prohibited by Title VII, in most cases an employer still
retains the right to establish different grooming regulations for male and
female employees under the Act.
C The "Grooming Cases"
For the most part, challenges to grooming codes as a discriminatory em-
ployment practice have been initiated by male claimants.2" 3 Although
such challenges may appear somewhat frivolous, they attack the essence of
traditional sexual stereotypes - physical appearance. In Roberts v. Gen-
eral Mills, Inc. ,204 an employer in the food processing business required
male employees who came into contact with food to wear hats and their
female coworkers to wear hairnets. A male employee discharged for wear-
ing a hairnet sued under Title VII.2 °5 The district court held that the clas-
sification was unreasonable since it was based on a sex stereotype and not
28 (1977) (Title VII is a flat and absolute prohibition against all sex discrimination in condi-
tions of employment). See also Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973) (retirement plans establishing different ages of retirement
for male and female employees violate Title VII); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D.
Conn. 1974), afd, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Connecticut State
Employees' Retirement Act providing women with retirement benefits five years earlier than
similarly situated men violates Title VII).
202. But see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), in which the Court
held that a racial affirmative action plan did not violate Title VII. By examining the legisla-
tive history of the Act, the Court determined that Congress' intent to eliminate racial dis-
crimination could not be interpreted as prohibiting the private sector from taking affirmative
steps to accomplish that goal. While § 7030) of the Act does not require an employer to
grant preferential treatment to any group because of race, there is nothing in the Act which
precludes employers from taking such action. Id at 4854. The Weber decision, by relaxing
Title VII's prohibition of discrimination in employment, raises serious questions as to the
continued effectiveness of the Act in the area of sex discrimination. Whether the decision
will alter the Court's treatment of the compensatory rationale in the context of sex under
Title VII remains to be seen. Recently, in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978), the Supreme Court determined that an employment pension fund requiring larger
monthly contributions from female employees than from their male counterparts violated
Title VII. Rejecting the generalization that "women, as a class, do outlive men," id at 707,
the Court examined the purpose of Title VII and concluded that the basic policy of the Act
requires a focus upon fairness to individuals rather than classes. Id at 709. Since the lon-
gevity distinction was based solely on sex, the employment pension plan unlawfully discrim-
inated against women. Id at 709-10.
203. See generally Golden, Sex Discrimination and Hair-Length Requirements Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - The Long and Short of It, 25 LAB. L.J. 336 (1974).
204. 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
205. Id at 1057.
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the grooming habits of the individual employee.2 °6
However, a contrary result was reached by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co. 207 where the court considered whether an employer's grooming regu-
lations for the hair length of male technical service employees unlawfully
discriminated against the claimant on the basis of his sex.208 The court,
holding that no substantial federal question existed, examined the purpose
of the statute20 9 and concluded that good grooming regulations were rea-
sonable requirements in furtherance of the company's policy. Thus, the
regulation did not amount to discrimination on the basis of an immutable
characteristic.
210
Similarly, in Wllingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. ,211 the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed the principle that distinctions in employment practices
between men and women on the basis of something other than immutable
characteristics does not inhibit employment opportunity in violation of Ti-
tle VII. 21 2 In Willingham the claimant alleged that the sole basis for the
company's refusal to hire him as a copy layout artist was its objection to
the length of his hair.21 3 The court examined whether the actions of Ma-
con Telegraph constituted "sex plus" discrimination 2 4 and found that the
employment practice in question was more closely related to how an em-
ployer runs his business than to equality of employment opportunity.
Since Title VII was intended to provide equal access to the job market, the
court concluded that an employer's preferences for the grooming of his
206. Id
207. 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
208. Id at 1119.
209. Id. at 1125-26. There is nothing in the Act or its legislative history to suggest that
an employer's discharge of an employee because of contravention of grooming regulations
would violate Title VII.
210. Id Hair is not an immutable characteristic since it may be changed at will. See
notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
211. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
212. Id at 1092.
213. Id at 1086. In 1972, the district court had granted a summary judgment in favor of
Macon Telegraph. 352 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Ga. 1972). On appeal, however, the circuit
court reversed, finding a prima facie case of sexual discrimination. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1973). Accordingly, it remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
214. Sex-plus discrimination involves the classification of employees on the basis of sex
plus one other ostensibly neutral characteristic. By including this type of discrimination in
the interpretation of § 704, "similarly situated individuals of either sex cannot be discrimi-
nated against vis a vis members of their own sex unless some distinction is made with respect
to those of the opposite sex." 507 F.2d at 1089. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971) (lacking business necessity, an employer may not refuse to hire women with
pre-school age children if it hires similarly situated men).
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employees did not inhibit employment opportunity.215
A majority of the circuits216 have adopted the position that differing
grooming requirements for men and women do not contravene Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination. Accordingly, male challenges to em-
ployer grooming standards have for the most part been unsuccessful.
217
But, in the significant areas of retirement benefits, protective labor prac-
tices, and "female" professions, men have met with a great deal of success.
Title VII has demanded that men and women be considered on an individ-
ual basis without regard to generic stereotypes. Clearly, the Act has pro-
vided men, as well as women, with increased benefits and opportunities.218
III. CONCLUSION
Although the movement for sexual equality has generally been associ-
ated with women, it unmistakably embraces men as well. Each successful
challenge to a discriminatory statute or employment practice perpetuating
traditional stereotypic myths provides both sexes with greater freedom to
pursue their chosen professions and lifestyles. A major obstacle to over-
coming pervasive sex discrimination in society, however, has been the
Supreme Court's reluctance to treat sex as a suspect class deserving the
same strict scrutiny accorded race, alienage, and national origin.
The Court's recalcitrance has left a legacy of opinions difficult to recon-
215. 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
216. See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Con-
tinental S.E. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co.,
537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th
Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc),
vacating, 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
217. Golden, supra note 203, at 351. For a discussion of whether sexual harassment
should provide aggrieved men and women with a cause of action under Title VII, see Note,
Sexual Harrassment and Title VII The Foundationsfor the Elimination of Sexual Coopera-
tion as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007 (1978). See also Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (where female employees' superior was bisexual, his insistence
upon sexual favors from female does not constitute gender discrimination because it would
apply to male and female employees alike).
218. The operation of Title VII foreshadows how, in the area of employment, the Equal
Rights Amendment would function. If passed, the amendment would provide the initiative
for legislatures to develop similar provisions in other areas. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freed-
man, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871, 936 (1971). The ERA would do away with a dual system of equal rights and
the existing pattern of piecemeal change by providing an absolute prohibition of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in every facet of our lives. See also Emerson, In Support ofthe Equal
Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 225 (1971); Mendelson, ERA, The Supreme
Court, andAllegations of Gender Bias, 44 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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cile. The "middle-tier" equal protection analysis, now apparently the
norm in sex discrimination cases, fosters uncertainty in the law and allows
considerable latitude in the disparate treatment of the sexes. Although
Congress has tried to bridge some of the gaps created by the Supreme
Court's uncertain approach to gender classifications, Title VII's guarantee
of equal treatment of the sexes in the area of employment cannot ensure
equality of treatment under the law in all areas. It is time for the Court to
come to terms with the problem of sex discrimination and recognize that
anything less than a strict scrutiny approach will have the inevitable effect
of perpetuating certain types of gender classifications thereby reinforcing
the stereotyped perceptions that stand as a barrier to the realization of
equal rights for men and women alike.
Susan Moss Ringler
